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The Rhetoric of Anti-Relativism
in a Culture of Certainty
HOWARD LESNICK†
[THE DUKE OF] NORF OLK (Walks away and turns ) All right—
we‟re at war with the P ope! The P ope‟s a Prince, isn‟t he?
[SIR THOMAS] MORE He is.
NORFOLK And a bad one?
MORE Bad enough. But the theory is that he‟s also the Vicar of
God, the descendant of St. Peter, our only link with Christ.
NORFOLK (Sneering) A tenuous link.
MORE Oh, tenuous indeed.
NORFOLK (To the others) Does this make sense? . . . You‟ll forfeit
all you‟ve got—which includes the respect of your country—for a
theory?
MORE (Hotly) The Apostolic Succession of the Pope is (Stops;
interested) . . . Why, it‟s a theory, yes; you can‟t see it; can‟t touch
it; it‟s a theory. . . . But what matters to me is not whether it‟s true
or not but that I believe it to be true, or rather, not that I believe
it, but that I believe it . . . .

Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons1

† Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This
Essay had its genesis in a paper prepared for a conference on “Law and
Democracy in the Empire of Force,” held at the University of Michigan Law
School in April 2007. I thank Professors James Boyd White, of Michigan, and H.
Jefferson Powell, of Duke University, Law Schools, for inviting me to
participate and for very helpful comments on the paper. I also acknowledge,
with thanks, the insights of Professors Edward A. Hartnett, of Seton Hall, and
Amelia J. Uelmen, of Fordham University, Law Schools.
1. ROBERT BOLT, A M AN FOR A LL S EASO NS 91 (1990).
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Nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another
belief.

Donald Davidson 2
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I NTRODUCTION

The unholy trinity of much public discourse today is
Liberalism, Secularism, and Relativism. Like a (very small)
deck of cards, they are often thought to support one
another, to engender one another, at times allowed even to
stand in for one another semantically. Whether as three or
as one, they are widely viewed as the root cause of much of
our social malaise.
Let me start with expressions of the evils of the first
two “isms,” chosen almost at random:
Liberalism . . . seems unable to arrest the barbarism of modern
culture; indeed, contem porary liberalism is impl icated in many of
the most corrosive moral and intellectual trends of our tim e. 3

2. DO NALD D AVIDSON , A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in
S UBJE CTIVE , INTERS UBJECTIVE , O BJECTIVE 137, 141 (2001).
3. Matthew Berke, A Jewish Appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching, in
CATHOLICISM ,
LI BERALISM ,
AND
COMMUNITARI ANISM :
T HE
C AT HOLI C
INTELLECTUAL TRADITIO N AND T HE M O RAL FO UNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 235, 237
(Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds.,1995).
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The general climate of society . . . shows a radical loss of the sense
of the transcendent, a devaluation of the religious dim ension of
human experience, and a great disregard for spiritual values. As a
consequence of this general social im poverishment caused by
secularism, life both personal and social is m ore and m ore guided
by practical atheism, which leaves unchecked the w orst human
tendencies and thus delivers people to the other great vices of
these societies: individualism, utilitarianism, hedonism, materialism,
and consum erism. 4

I find sadly apt the description of our culture as
“corrosive,” in some ways even “barbaric,” and as widely
characterized by “individualism, utilitarianism, hedonism,
materialism, and consumerism.” 5 I also deeply deplore the
“radical loss of the sense of the transcendent” 6 in
contemporary society. I find seriously problematic, however,
the tendentious attribution of such social evils to the
influence of relativism, liberalism, and secularism,
especially because it serves to obscure the fact that the
political outlook of many of the severest critics of liberalism
and secularism often legitimates that very catalogue of
social ills.
To me, the terms liberalism and secularism are too
protean for words, and I will not address their
responsibility for prevalent social evils. I offer instead a
critique of anti-relativism.
I. ANTI-RELATIVISM
I confess at the outset that my claim will in no way be
new; indeed, were it not for anti-relativism‟s robust
popularity, my objection to its rhetoric could justly be
viewed as banal. But almost any day one can find published
efforts to claim warrant for a set of moral positions by
standing firm against relativism.
The truth of a moral claim cannot be established by an
objection to relativism. 7 At best, the objection can succeed
4. HERMINIO R ICO , JOHN P AUL II AND T HE LEGACY OF DI GNITATIS H UMANAE
205 (2002) (attributing this view to Pope John Paul II).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. In this claim, I am following Clifford Geertz, who, in coining (so far as I
am aware) the term, “anti anti-relativism,” called anti-relativism “an antique

Copyright © 2007 by Buffalo Law Review

890

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

(if it is not merely declaimed) in establishing that such a
claim may have “truth value,” that its truth is not “only a
feeling” or “just a matter of opinion,” but it does not begin to
address the question whether the proposition posited or
asserted correctly expresses the truth of the matter. Indeed,
it is only because I reject relativism, as I do, that I can
contend that the widespread use of the charge of relativism
to allow one to avoid engaging with claims to a different
“knowledge” of the truth regarding a moral issue is not
simply annoying but wrongful; a form of rhetorical
immorality, if you will. The wrong is compounded when, as
too often is the case, the charge sweeps all whose moral
sensibilities differ into the same derisively labeled trash
pail, and compounded further when defense of a position on
anti-relativist grounds is bound up with a repellant
indifference to the human suffering the position casually
overlooks or seeks to justify.
The anti-relativist might object at the outset that I am
misconceiving the claim. It is not a specific moral position—
a single ethical assertion, say, divorce is a wrongful act
(whether always or only in specified circumstances)—that
one is seeking to support (in the example, by attacking a
defense of the moral standing of divorce) as based on
relativism. That claim might well be termed a category
mistake, supporting a challenged ethical contention with a
meta-ethical one. The relevant claim, this contention
maintains, is rather that what might be termed a “culture
of relativism” in contemporary society creates a generalized
aura of lassitude about the truth of many moral scruples,
such that people come to take a “live and let live” attitude
toward a whole range of conduct previously thought
freighted with (negative) moral significance. That fog
dispelled, the immorality of such conduct once again will
appear plain.
The claim so articulated begs the question, however, of
the moral status of the panoply of “moral scruples” that
previously reigned unchallenged. The critique is often based
not on lassitude, but on an assertedly long overdue
emergence of a more penetrating morality, recognizing and
mistake.” Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-relativism, 86 AM . ANTHROPO LOGIST 263
(1984), reprinted in RELATIVISM : INTE RP RETATION AND C ONFRONT ATI ON 12, 12
(Michael Krausz ed.,1989). With Geertz, my effort is “to counter a view rather
than to defend the view it claims to be counter to.” Id. at 12.
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seeking to work free of the pervasive immorality of
(formerly) prevailing moral norms. To stay with the
example, it is not divorce but rather imprisoning people
(usually women) in oppressive marriages that is wrongful.
Expressing the emancipatory claim in relativist terms is
indeed at times an unfortunate way of making what is in
truth a profoundly content-laden moral objection. 8 But the
counter-charge against “relativism” is nonetheless a device
to reaffirm the traditional moral position without needing
to engage seriously with the morality-grounded concerns of
its critics. That it may succeed in diverting attention from
the need for such an engagement is hardly a defense.
Whether the conflict in moral norms is posed as a
matter of the general cultural environment or of specific
moral questions, my contention is that the issue is evaded
by framing it as the infirmity of relativism.
Objecting to the misuse of questioning the soundness of
relativism does not of course warrant ruling objections to
relativism out of bounds, and I will say why I do reject it as
a meta-ethical stance. The focus on relativism is a
distraction from recognition of the significance of conflicts
in justified beliefs about a moral question; what is
condemned as a “culture of relativism” may in fact be (less
ringingly) a “culture of conflicting justified beliefs,”
concededly complicating our moral environment, but all
things considered constituting an enrichment, or at the
least a potential enrichment, of it.
II. RELATIVISM
The primary question I will consider has arisen in
settings as inconspicuous as was Geertz‟s venue—the 1983
annual meeting of the American Anthropologists
Association—and as unprecedentedly public as was the
prelude to the 2005 Conclave of the Roman Catholic College
of Cardinals, where in his last published statement prior to
being elected Pope, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, with a very
large percentage of the people of the world attending
closely, condemned a perceived “dictatorship of relativism”:

8. “The claim that moral laws are unjust is inescapably a moral claim.”
ROBERT P. GEO RGE , M AKING M EN M ORAL: C IVIL LIBERTIES AND P UBLIC M ORALIT Y
3 (1993).
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[R]elativism, which is letting oneself be tossed and “swept along by
every wind of teaching,” looks like the only attitude up to today‟s
standards. We are moving toward a dictatorship of relativism that
does not recognize anything as certain and has as its highest goal
one‟s own ego and one‟s own desires. 9

In somewhat more than twenty years Geertz‟s “anti
anti-relativism” has garnered approximately 500 Google
entries; in slightly more than twenty months Pope
Benedict‟s “dictatorship of relativism” some 50,000. 10 But
that disparity has no evaluative import, in either direction.
Geertz devoted much of his critique to a demonstration
of the rhetorical excesses of anti-relativists in
anthropology.11 I prefer to look here at the target of the
firing squad, and its appropriateness as a target, rather
than at the ammunition used to dispatch it. What is
“relativism”? There is of course a variousness in the beliefs
of self-described relativists, but it will serve for present
purposes to note two variants. The first, emphasizing what
morality is thought to be relative to, is well summarized by
Judge Richard Posner:
[T]here are no interesting m oral universals. There are tautological
ones, such as “murder is wrong” where “murder” means “wrongful
killing” . . . . But what counts as murder . . . varies enorm ously
from society to society. There are a handful of rudim entary
principles of social cooperation . . . that may be common to all
human societies . . . . But they are too abstract to be criterial.
Meaningful m oral realism is therefore out, and a form (not every
form) of m oral relativism is in. Relativism in turn invites an
adaptat ionist conception of morality, in which m orality is judged—
nonmorally, in the way that a hammer might be judged well or
9. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Future Pope‟s Homily for Conclave‟s Opening,
34 ORIGINS 720 (2005). The quoted passage is from the Letter to the Ephesians
4:14. A slightly different translation appears in the official text:
[L]etting oneself be “tossed here and there, carried about by every wind
of doctrine,” seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times.
We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize
anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's
own ego and desires.
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice (Apr. 18, 2005),
http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_20050418_
en.html.
10. As of April 1, 2007.
11. Geertz, supra note 7, at 15-17.
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poorly adapted to its goal of hammering nails into wood or
plaster —by its contribution to the survival, or other ultim ate
goals, of a society or som e group within it . . . . [M]oral progress is
in the eye of the beholder. 12

This approach sees morality as a matter of convention
and function, a description of social practices and utilities,
lacking any basis for noninstrumental evaluation. A
stronger version of relativism as to morality asserts that,
when one says that a certain practice is “wrong” (or “right,”
in the moral sense; “immoral” or “moral”), he or she can
only be telling you something about the speaker. Morality,
David Hume asserted, “is more properly felt than judg‟d
of.” 13 To a relativist (Hume was not), the feeling cannot be
evidence of a truth existing independently of it, to which it
points, because there is no “truth to which it points”; there
exists only a “taste,” “preference,” or condemnatory practice
of the evaluator. On this view, as my former colleague,
Michael Moore, put it: “[T]he only thing to be said about
watermelons or concentration camps is that some people
like them and some people don‟t.” 14
Moore‟s bon mot has to be understood in context. Of
course, it is not literally the “only” thing a relativist
(professed or otherwise) would say. Richard Rorty, for
example, although he urges us to “give up the idea that the
point of discourse is to represent reality accurately,” 15
would unquestionably not be neutral in his judgment of
concentration camps. 16 What a relativist would not do is
ground a negative judgment about concentration camps in a
commitment to a “mind-independent” truth.
12. R ICHARD A. POSNE R, T HE PRO BLEM ATI CS
(1999) (citation omitted).
13. DAVID H UME , A TRE ATISE
1986).

OF

OF

M ORAL

AND

LEG AL T HEORY 6

H UMAN N AT URE 470 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,

14. Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. R EV . 1061, 1064.
15. R ICHARD R O RT Y, P HILOSOP HY AND S OCI AL H OPE 85-86 (1999). “„[M]oral
progress‟ is at least in part a matter of increasing moral knowledge . . . about
something independent of our social practices . . . .” Id. at 84. While regarding
the term as an “epithet,” he acknowledges that his views fit his own conception
of a relativist: “of course we pragmatists never call ourselves relativists.” Id. at
xvi.
16. See his endorsement of Judith Shklar‟s famous definition of a liberal as
one who believes that “cruelty is the worst thing we do.” RICHARD RORTY ,
CONTINGE NCY, IRO NY, AND S OLIDARITY , at xv (1989).
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Moore‟s and Ratzinger‟s statements have in common a
critical stance toward relativism—and a tendency to
describe it in ways that maximize its unacceptability to a
reader or listener. It is necessary to be careful about taking
the content or meaning of a disputed way of thinking from
one who is opposed to it. Ratzinger‟s “definition” of
relativism is pure invective; few if any relativists think that
all positions are equal, or regard “one‟s own desires” as
unquestionable; it is only that one‟s values or goals cannot
be evaluated by an external standard of truth, for no such
external standard exists. Whether that is a distinction
without a difference is a fair question, which I will address
in context; the answer should not, however, be taken for
granted.
It is also necessary to try to untangle the relation
between relativism and secular thinking, and between
relativism and liberalism, describing those relations
unaffected by any presumptive condemnation or embrace of
any of them. I will begin with relativism and secularism.
III. RELATIVISM AND SECULARISM
It has often been observed that all secular philosophies
since Descartes begin in doubt; therefore in one sense they
do not (in Cardinal Ratzinger‟s words) “recognize anything
as certain.” 17
The official English text also renders his words as,
“every wind of doctrine,” referring to relativism as “the only
attitude that can cope with modern times.” 18 This is a
significantly more cautious statement than “„every wind of
teaching‟, [which] looks like the only attitude up to today‟s
standards.” 19 Although the modification obviously intended
to retain a pejorative cast, were the statement regretful
rather than militant I would readily agree that relativism
often “seems the only doctrine that can cope with modern
times.” Religions begin in faith, their adherents often
17. Ratzinger, Future Pope‟s Homily for Conclave‟s Opening, supra note 9, at
720. The official English text uses the word, “definitive,” rather than “certain,”
evidencing a careful attention to nuance and toning the stat ement down a bit.
See Ratzinger, Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice, supra note 9, at 2.
18. Ratzinger, Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice, supra note 9, at 2.
19. Ratzinger, Future Pope‟s Homily for Conclave‟s Opening, supra note 9, at
720.

Copyright © 2007 by Buffalo Law Review

2007]

RHETORIC OF ANTI-RELATIVISM

895

committing themselves to positing the truth of specific
(albeit often differing) premises. 20 Yet, as Arthur Leff
pointed out a generation ago,21 most secular philosophies
soon coast along with grounding premises that, if not held
with certainty, are deemed “proven” by the rhetorical device
of positing assignment of the burden of proof to an
unprovable “contradictory value.”22 For their part,
relativists too accept the “truth” of specific propositions as
working hypotheses, rationally (if only provisionally)
grounding action. 23
A tight nexus between relativist and secular thought
has been propounded in three different ways; the first two
seek to protect religious belief by condemning relativism,
the third, proceeding from a critical stance toward religion,
seeks to protect relativism by claiming that non-relativist
thinking is essentially religious. As usually stated, all are
fallacious, in my judgment.

20. This is not the only way in which religion is primarily understood.
However, it is the sense most widely encountered, and the one most relevant to
the present discussion. For one presentation of a common taxonomy of what, to
people thinking of themselves as religious, religion is primarily about, see
GEORGE A. LI ND BECK, T HE NATURE OF DO CT RINE : RELIGION AND T HEOLOG Y I N A
POSTLIBE RAL AGE (1984). Lindbeck classifies the several conceptions of religion
as “cognitively propositional,” primarily involving “informative propositions or
truth claims about objective realities”; “experiential-expressive,” described as
“noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes , or
existential orientations”; and “cultural-linguistic,” which are “communally
authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action.” Id. at 16-18.
21. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L. J.
1229.
22. See id. at 1240. Also, as Leff notes:
If a series of values is set forth to be justified—“proved” in the strong
sense . . . all attempts will necessarily fail. On the other hand, if the set
includes a value that is to prevail unless some other contradictory
value is “proved,” then the value not requiring proof will always win.
Id.
23. John Dewey put the matter clearly:
If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of conditions
which remove need for doubt . . . . This settled condition is a
demarcating characteristic of genui ne belief. . . . [Yet] [t]he
“settlement” of a particular situation . . . is no guarantee that that
settled conclusion will always remain settled. . . . [T]here is no belief so
settled as not to be exposed to further inqui ry.
JOHN DEWEY , LOGIC : THE THEO RY OF INQ UIRY 7-8 (1938).
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A. Acceptance of (Some Set of) Religious Beliefs is the Only
Safeguard Against Relativist Thinking
As Dostoevsky‟s Ivan Karamazov famously put it:
“Without God . . . everything is permitted.” 24 The most one
can charitably say about this claim is that it is somewhat
understandable: One who does not have a secular
consciousness might well imagine that one who does will
tend to doubt the claim of moral reality, and will therefore
lack any basis for denying the “permissibility” of any act.
Ivan‟s fear is widely shared, and not to be sneered at.
However, the generalization is infirm both logically and
empirically. Many who reject theistic metaphysics honestly
hold, and can respectably defend, a belief in the existence
and discernment of moral truth, transcending personal or
cultural boundaries. More fundamentally, those not holding
such a belief almost never deem everything “permitted,”
albeit they are using the word in a sense that does not posit
an external source of constraint.25 That both sorts of
24. FYOD OR D OSTOEVSKY , THE BROT HE RS KARAMAZOV 589 (N. Point Press
1990).
25. Reference to philosophers as different as Michael Moore and Ma rtha
Nussbaum suffices to establish the trut h of these two sentences. Rega rding
Moore, see Michael S. Moore, Good Without God, in N AT URAL L AW ,
LIBE RALISM , AND M O RALIT Y 221, 260 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (concl uding
that “God does no work at all” in grounding the “objectivity of morals.”) .
Martha Nussbaum, writing of “ethical standards that are independent of the
norms and traditions of a particular culture,” maintains that such a non relativist conception “does not mean that justice and eq uality and personhood
are supposed to be extra-human and ahistorical standards. For some
philosophers who talk t his wa y (e.g. Plato) they are; for others (Socrates,
Aristotle, Kant, Mill) . . . they are not.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values:
A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 Y ALE J.L. & HUM AN. 197, 214 (1994).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S . 163, 165-66, 173 (1965), ga ve powerful
recognition to the existence and salience of bi nding moral scruples not
grounded i n religi ous belief as that term is typically understood. Although
eligibility for exemption from t he draft on the basis of conscientious ob jection
to participation in war was limited by Congress to those whose objection was
grounded in “reli gious training and belief,” defined as belief in “a Supreme
Being,” the Court deemed eligible for exemption an applicant who declared
himself unable to avow s uch a belief. The Court of Appeals held:
When Daniel Andrew Seeger insists that he is obeying the dictates of
his conscience or the imperatives of an absolute morality, it would
seem impossible to say with assurance that he is not bowing to
“external commands” in virtually the same sense as is the objector who
defers to the will of a supernatural power.
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skeptics may not live up to their beliefs and professions in
no way distinguishes them from religious folks.
Tendencies apart, as a claim of entailment the
proposition either begs the question or is a non sequitur.
Arthur Leff, describing God—whether “He” exists or not—
as the “unchallengeable creator of the right and the good,”
famously claimed that, absent God, “the only available
evaluators are people,” and no premise said to ground a
moral position can withstand “the grand sez who.” 26 It is a
fundamental error, however, to read “challengeable” as
“non-existent.” Anti-relativists may contend that, without
God, all moral deliberation is a facade, rationalization
justifying willfulness. They are flat-out wrong in this,
however. Rationalization is an ever-present temptation, and
belief in God hardly inoculates one against its hazards, 27 for
the question how one discerns the Will of God remains.
“Challenge” is as common within religiously-grounded
moral disputation as it is across the religious-secular
divide. That the “right answer” is sometimes in dispute does
not imply that there are no wrong answers, or that all
contenders are of equal merit. 28

326 F.2d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1964), aff‟d in part, rev‟d in part, 380 U.S. 163
(1965). The Supreme Court agreed, findi ng that “the statute does not
distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs.” 380 U.S. at
186.
Moreover, as the references to Rorty, supra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text, make clear, even those denying the existence of any culture-independent
moral standards nonetheless draw moral boundaries, albeit ones relative to
culture.
26. Leff, supra note 21, at 1230, 1233.
27. Indeed, the very confidence of anti-relativists in the matter tempts me to
wonder whether their confidence manifests an (understandable) desire to be
“lashed to the mast” of a transcendental authority, lest they too lapse into
rationalization, and thereby into error.
28. I find Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 206-09, especially helpful on this
point. Matthew Berke, on the other hand, falls into a polarized analysis that
blocks his awareness of the point made in the text. “In the absence of a ny final
standards,” he asserts (regarding relativism), “the individual is completely free
to determine right and wrong for himself or herself, and to live accordingl y.”
Berke, supra note 3, at 240. Yes, in a sense; and in the presence of final
standards, an individual is “completely free” to misperceive or misapply them.
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B. Relativism is Necessarily Grounded in a Secular Outlook
on the World
While the previous claim presumes a rejection of (or an
aversive reaction to) relativism in order to support
acceptance of a religious outlook, one making this assertion
typically presumes a rejection of secular thinking in order
to support a rejection of relativism. Empirically, it is
probably true that most relativists are nonreligious. Those
who are not are likely to think of themselves as pluralists
rather than relativists. 29 To their detractors, the distinction
is of no great importance.30 Religious pluralists, however,
may appropriately cavil at having their mere existence
falsified by being termed an oxymoron. There is a sense in
which they do “relativize” their religious profe ssions, which
a more traditional theist honestly regards as oxymoronic. In
doing that, however, the theist is staking a claim to a
certain definition of “religion,” and sincerity and
bewilderment (even anger) at having to surrender exclusive
possession of one‟s most dearly cherished words does not
suffice to establish title.
C. Belief in the Existence of the Mind-Independent Reality
of Moral Principles is Necessarily a “Religious” Belief,
Whether Acknowledged or Disclaimed
This claim is ordinarily made by one who views religion
as an inherently defective mystification, and seeks to
support relativism as the only way to steer clear of such
failings. It is perhaps less commonly encountered today
than it was a few generations ago. Richard Rorty, although
careful to distinguish the religious from the secular realist,
regards them for this purpose as equally benighted:
“Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded
theoretical answers to . . . moral dilemmas . . . is still, in his
29. For example, see the essays contained in THE M YTH OF CHRISTI AN
UNIQUENESS : TOW ARD A PL URALISTIC THEO LOG Y OF RELIGIONS (John Hicks &
Paul F. Knitter eds., 1987). In particular, see Langdon Gilkey, Plurality and Its
Theological Implications, in id. at 37, and Paul F. Knitter, Toward a Liberation
Theology of Religions, in id. at 178, 181-90.
30. See, e.g., C HRISTI AN UNIQ UENESS RECO NSIDERED : T HE M YTH OF A
PLURALISTIC T HEOL OG Y OF R ELIGIONS (Ga vin D‟Costa ed., 1990). In particular,
see Leslie Newbigin, Religion for the Marketplace, in id. at 135, and Paul J.
Griffiths, The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended, in id. at 157.
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heart, a theologian or a metaphysician.” 31 This usage
presumes, a bit subliminally, the inherent incompatibility
of claims about the nature of reality with respectable
intellectual work. 32 Ironically enough, it is similar to the
use of the term “relativist” as an epithet, of which Rorty
justly complains. 33 In truth, the charge that secular realists
are in fact religious is made as a rhetorical move: when
coming from a secular relativist, it is meant to consign them
to a world-view held in a certain amount of disdain; when
coming from a religious anti-relativist, it serves (in a
psychologically complex way) to undermine the legitimacy
of a secular avowal by asserting that moral realism is no
less a religion, which the relativist presumably looks down
upon (although the speaker does not).
One can, however, support a claimed connection
between moral realism and religion without a pejorative
cast on a quasi-definitional ground. Clifford Geertz
describes “the heart of . . . the religious perspective” as
“the conviction that the values one holds are grounded in
the inherent structure of reality, that between the way one
ought to live and the way things really are there is an
unbreakable inner connection.” 34
A strikingly similar assertion comes, interestingly, from
a very different thinker. Bertrand Russell wrote over a
century ago of “the position which we have become
accustomed to regard as specially religious, maintaining
that, in some hidden manner, the world of fact is really
harmonious with the world of ideals.” 35 God, Russell
asserts, is “the mystic unity of what is and what should

31. R ORT Y, supra note 16, at xv.
32. Michael Moore, presenting the case for the validity of the claim of moral
realism, begins by acknowledging that the term “conjures up images of a kind of
Aurora Borealis, but without the lights.” Moore, supra note 14, at 1062. I have
suggested that, “when the talk is in religious terms . . . the image comes with
lights, and the charge of mystification is that they dazzle rather than
illuminate.” HOWARD LES NICK , LISTENI NG FO R G OD: R ELIGION AND M O RAL
DISCERNMENT 53 (1998).
33. See supra, note 15.
34. C LIFFO RD GEE RT Z, ISL AM OBSE RVED: RELIGIOUS
M OROCCO AND INDO NESIA 97 (1968).

DEVELOPMENT

35. B ERTRAND RUSSELL, A Free Man‟s Worship, in M YSTI CISM
49 (1951).
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be.” 36
It would not, however, be faithful to the spirit of
Geertz‟s “inductive” approach to the problem of “defining”
religion37 or to Russell‟s self-described skepticism 38 to use
insights such as these as a basis for ascribing a religious
orientation to one who is fervently claiming to be a nonbeliever.
To me, the core of the matter is this: Whether secular
thinking is in error is an ontological, not an empirical or
pragmatic, question. To attack secularism as promoting
relativism, or to attack relativism as grounded in
secularism, engages with neither secular nor relativist
thinking. Even if in the process it did not mistake the
source (or the consequence) of a moral stance that it means
to dispute, it would be rhetorically objectionable, for it
displaces attention from the content of that stance.
The truth, of course, is that both secular and relativist
thinking share, to a substantial degree, a common cause—a
market economy—which at the same time legitimates the
very “individualism, utilitarianism, hedonism, materialism,
and consumerism” 39 that many anti-relativists selectively
deplore. As Craig M. Gay, examining “The Recent
Evangelical Debate Over Capitalism,” 40 puts the matter:
[T]he market economy has institutionalized . . . a particular kind

36. Id.
37. Geertz abjures the search for a “uni versal property” that “divides
religious phenomena off from nonreligious ones with Cartesian sharpness,” in
favor of “a set of inexact similarities, which are yet genuine similarities, [which]
we sense to inhere in a given body of material.” GEERTZ , supra note 34, at 96-97.
He terms this approach “a definitional procedure of a more inductive sort . . . .
We are attempting to articulate a way of looking at the world, not to describe an
unusual object.” Id.
38. Russell, supra note 35, at 49-50. Additionally,
When we have realised that Power is largely bad, that man, with his
knowledge of good and evil, is but a helpless atom in a world which has
no such knowledge, the choice is again presented to us: Shall we
worship Force, or shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God exist and
be evil, or shall he be recognised as the creation of our own conscience?
Id.
39. R ICO, supra note 4, at 205.
40. This is the subtitle of his book, CRAIG M. GAY, WIT H LIBE RTY AND JUSTICE
R ECENT EVANGELI CAL DEBATE OVER CAPIT ALISM (1991).

FOR WHOM ?: T HE
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of rationality. “[T ]he cost-profit calculus . . . powerfully propels the
logic of enterprise . . . rationalizing . . . man‟s tools and
philosophies, his m edical practice, his picture of the cosm os, his
outlook on life, everything in fact including his concepts of beauty
and justice and his spiritual am bitions.”
....
. . . [M]odern secularization and decadence are not entirely
attributable to “secular humanism.” Indeed, the nineteenth century cultural pattern to which many of those on the evangelical
right would have us return—a pattern in which capitalism was
more firmly bounded by the constraints of family, church, and
community—was at least in part destroyed by capitalism itself. 41

Yet, far too many self-professed anti-relativists are
quick to defend the ethic of a market economy, directing
their ire elsewhere. 42

41. Id. at 233-34 (quoting JOSEPH A. S CHUMPETE R, C API TALISM , S O CIALISM ,
DEMO CRACY 123-24 (1950)). Jeff Powell describes “[t]he accumulation of
private possessions, the rejection of intrusive social impositions, and the
assertion of individual autonomy” as “constitutive elements of American society
. . . for most if not all of the nation‟s history.” H. Jefferson Powell, The Earthly
Peace of the Liberal Republic, in C HRISTI AN PERS PECTIVES O N LEG AL THOUGHT
71, 85 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). He posits further that
“American society implicitly identifies the human good with [a] comfortable,
materialistic life . . . and is organized around the endless reproduction of that
lifestyle for those with the means . . . .” Id. Also see the critique of the
“dominance of the market over increasingly large domains of social and cultural
life” in David Hollenbach, Afterword: A Community of Freedom, in CAT HO LICISM
AND LIBE RALISM : C ONTRI BUTIONS TO A MERI CAN P UBLIC PHIL OSOP HY 327-32 (R.
Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach eds., 1994).
AND

42. See, for example, Todd W hitmore‟s critique of Michael Novak‟s fail ure
to recognize that “the seemingl y unending quest for more and more of ever
more specialized and refined items and services in a consumer societ y is a
spiritual and moral malady.” Todd David Whitmore, John Paul II, Michael
Novak, and the Distance Between Them, 21 ANN . S O C‟ Y C HRISTI AN ET HI CS 215,
224 (2001). See also, for a pe rhaps tri vial, but telling, example, Richard John
Neuhaus, A Word for Commercia lizing Christmas, FIRS T THI NGS , Dec. 1993, at
66, 76, warni ng his readers to be “braced for this year ‟s round of campaigning
against the commercialization of Christmas,” Neuhaus goes on: “Last year the
National Council of Churches (NCC) got a b road array of reli gious leaders hip
types to sign on with a „Campaign to Take Commercialism Out of Christmas.‟”
He quotes approvingly a description of the NCC‟s stance as “spiritual
arroga nce i n a kind of snobbish hostility to the simple pleasures people get i n
buying, gi ving, and receivi ng.” Id. Neuhaus goes on, stating, “ I see no
sympathy towa rd the i nstinct of generosity nor any real appreciation of the
genuine blessing of material prosperit y. Advertisers and merchants are
demonized, and t heir legitimate economic vocations a re demea ned.” Id.
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IV. RELATIVISM AND LIBERALISM
What of the relation between relativism and liberalism?
I have already commented (silently) on the claim that
relativism flows from liberalism by proffering as a
paradigmatic avowal of one core meaning of relativism, that
of a paradigmatic conservative, Judge Richard Posner.43
Recognizing, however, that the example may establish no
more than the almost boundless variousness of meaning
that the term, liberalism, has—Posner‟s support for “free
market” allocations might even garner him that
appellation—I will rely instead on another noted Chicago
conservative, Cardinal Francis George.
Cardinal George has supplied a penetrating and
balanced account of the several arenas of thought in which
the terms liberal and conservative each have varying but
mutually reinforcing meanings. It is, in my judgment, fairminded, respectful and careful, and worth quoting
extensively:
[In] the political context, . . . [c]onservatives usually associate
themselves with the constituted authorities, giving them the
benefit of the doubt so that the order which saves us from anarchy
and social violence can be maintained. Liberals contribute to the
common good by beginning m ost often with a suspicion about
abuse of authority and a critique of the exercise of power. They are
a “loyal opposition,” loyal to the goals of good governm ent but not
to the established rulers when the rulers themselves impede the
achievem ent of those goals.
In the economic context, . . . liberals are more concerned with the
distribution of wealth and look to governm ent to see that the
political equality of all citizens is mirrored, at least roughly, in
their economic equality . . . . Conservatives . . . tend to be more
concerned with the conditions of the creation of wealth and
understand that the right to economic initiative cannot be
separated from other individual rights and freedoms. In a business
economy, they argue, all are enriched in time, even if there are
serious inequalities for a tim e . . . .
In the psychological context, “liberal” and “conservative” describe
attitudes or mindsets toward societal change. Conservatives are
closed to changes which threaten good order and liberals are m ore
open to the risk of proposed change . . . .
43. POS NE R, supra note 12, at 6.

Copyright © 2007 by Buffalo Law Review

2007]

RHETORIC OF ANTI-RELATIVISM

903

In epistemological theory, . . . respective stances toward the
foundations of knowledge differentiate liberals and conservatives .
. . . Conservative certitude and the legitimate quest for certitude
about the foundations either of faith or of an intellectual discipline
can be pushed into fundam entalism; liberal criticism of the sam e
foundations can degenerate into skepticism or . . . relativism . . . .44

These attributions rigorously avoid exaggeration or
pejorative; I find in them nothing that a liberal or
conservative need seriously disavow or object to. (Indeed,
one would need to look elsewhere—although perhaps no
further than the remainder of the essay—even to infer from
them which stance the author favors). His only assertion of
the connection between liberalism and relativism—“liberal
criticism can degenerate into relativism”—obviously
presumes the infirmity of relativism, but he is speaking
about liberalism, not relativism. He resists any urge further
to link the two, and in place of the bogey that anti-relativist
rhetoric so often heatedly conjures up, we find in his words
only a cautionary admonition, one that liberals would do
well to take to heart. 45
Cardinal George‟s ability and willingness to speak
empathically of views he does not himself hold aids me to

44. Francis George, How Liberalism Fails the Church: The Cardinal
Explains, COMMO NWE AL, Nov. 19, 1999, at 24. Although of lesser relevance
here, Cardinal George‟s explication of the meaning of these terms in one
additional context , that of “American religion,” deserves not to be omitted. He
asserts:
[L]iberal religion treats God as an ideal, a goal expressing all that is
best in human experience, while the real agents of change in the world
are human persons. Religious langua ge is important poetry, agnostic
about who God is, but expressive of our experience of wholeness. . . .
Worship may be structured but, at its heart, religion is ethical and the
social agenda central. By contrast, conservative religion is keenly
aware of God ‟s agency. God is real, independent, powerful, active. God‟s
presence is felt in prayer and in the reading of his holy word. Religious
language is most often literal, and the Bible is often read much like a
newspaper . . . . The social agenda tends to be peripheral, because God
will change thi ngs at . . . some . . . moment we can only wait for.
Id. at 25.
45. An exchange wit h Ed Ha rtnett has led me to recognize—too late to
correct the error—that my passing agreement wit h Cardinal George‟s
admonition does not adequatel y attend to its importance a nd relevance. See
infra, note 112 and accompanyi ng text .
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realize that much of the asserted linking of liberalism and
relativism may proceed from an unacknowledged conflation
of relativism and pluralism. The similarities are real, yet
the differences are fundamental. Pluralism asserts that,
although objective criteria support (at least some) of our
ethical choices, a person‟s or group‟s beliefs (however
strongly held) do not justify insisting that others, who
believe the contrary, nonetheless live by them. Pluralism is
an approach to the question of how a society should respond
to the fact that there is a great (although not limitless)
diversity of moral norms among people of good will. To the
extent that pluralism speaks to us as individuals, it affects
our opinions and beliefs, not by altering their content or
even the assurance with which we hold them, but rather
ameliorating the intensity and fervor with which we assert
them and the stance that we take toward those whose
moral sense differs from our own.
There are some who regard the pluralism of civil society
as, at best, a regrettable necessity, perhaps hopefully a
temporary one, until enough of their fellow citizens come to
see the rightness of their views that there is the political
will needed to act on them. However, pluralism as a
philosophical stance—and here it may well be intertwined
with political liberalism—is rooted in a celebration, rather
than a grudging and resigned acceptance, of the diversity of
moral insight. Pluralism proceeds from the belief that as
humans we are created (and this word can be understood in
religious or secular terms) with the capacity and the desire
to seek, to discern, and to follow the good, but that in all of
those capacities and desires we are limited—in no way more
than in our capacity to know that we have authoritatively
found the Truth.
In this way, it may supply what Lawrence Hinman
terms a “middle ground” between relativism and realism
(which he terms “absolutism”), one that “incorporates
insights from both”:
From relativism, it retains the sensitivity to the contextuality of
our moral beliefs and the recognition that moral disagreem ent and
conflict are permanent features of the moral landscape. From
absolutism, it retains the commitm ent to the relevance of reasoned
discourse in the moral life and the belief that som e moral positions
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are better than others. 46

It would be naïve to suggest that those who scornfully
dismiss relativism, on pondering the ways in which
pluralism differs from it, would find pluralism attractive. I
do think that their continuing critique would necessarily
focus more authentically on the matters genuinely at issue,
which I will explore in the succeeding sections of this Essay.
V. TRUTH AND CERTAINTY
To return to what I believe is the fundamental failing of
anti-relativism, the attempt to support a moral claim by
attacking relativism, ignores—or, worse yet, diverts
attention from—the fact that any assertion of a truth about
morality raises, but does not answer, the question, how one
knows it. Jeffrey Stout has made the point well, in my
judgment:
I claim that positing a transcendent Moral Law (or the like) does
not help explain what it is for a moral proposition to be true. Nor, I
claim, does such a posit help as a criterion for judging the truth of
moral propositions. [However,] neither of these claims . . . implies
that there are no m oral truths. 47

To speak as Stout does is to insist that a claim of the
truth of a moral matter engages the distinction between
there being a “truth of a matter” (which exists independent
of what anyone believes regarding it) and the justification
for believing the truth of an assertion regarding its content.
The existence of such a distinction is certainly open to
challenge, but it should not be elided, whether by one who
doubts the reality of a mind-independent truth or by one
who is certain that he or she knows what the content of
that truth is.
46. LAW RENCE HI NMAN, E THI CS : A PL URALISTI C A P PROACH TO M O RAL T HEO RY
48 (1994). On the need for pluralism to “police its boundaries,” see JOAN F.
GOODM AN & HOWARD LESNI CK, T HE M ORAL S TAKE IN ED UCATIO N: CONTESTED
PREMISES AND PRACTICES 100-03 (2000).
47. J EFFREY S TO UT, ET HICS A FTER B ABEL : THE L ANG UAGES OF M ORALS AND
THEIR DISCONTENTS 35 (2001). Simon Blackburn notes that “you can admit the
authority of truth without immediately supposing you possess it.” S IMON
BLACKBURN , TRUT H: A GUI DE 29 (2005). Yes, and you can proclaim the authority
of truth without establishing that you possess it.
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The distinction is challenged frontally by many
relativists. Denying the existence of “a transcendent Moral
Law,” 48 they draw their inspiration from John Dewey, to
whom both belief and knowledge describe the same
condition, which he termed “warranted assertibility” and
which he described as “the institution of conditions which
remove need for doubt” 49:
Belief may be so understood as to be a fitting design ation for the
outcome of inquiry. . . . The word knowledge is also a suitable term
to designate the objective and close of inquiry . . . . That which
satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by definition, knowledge; it is
knowledge because it is the appropriate close of inquiry . . . . [T ]he
term “warranted assertion” is preferred to the terms belief and
knowledge. It is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms . . . .50

What Dewey regarded as removing an ambiguity to me
creates it. It is true that relativists would not define
knowledge, as most philosophers ordinarily do, as belief
that is true as well as justified 51 because such usage
suggests that “true” has a meaning that goes beyond
“justification” or “warrant.” Since relativists deny that
suggestion, they naturally will deem the standard
definition question-begging. However, by giving “truth” a
meaning that effectively conflates it with justification, they
are also begging the question (although assuming a
different answer).
It seems clearer to retain the verbal distinction, while
allowing relativists to preserve their objection to the
metaphysical existence of truth so defined, rather than to
define the issue away. Preserving the distinction between
belief and knowledge permits us readily to understand one
another across that critical boundary, without necessarily
crossing it, in either direction. For a non-relativist to assert
that a specific moral norm is “true” is most usefully
understood as a claim about (an instance of) the content of
48. Id.
49. DEWEY, supra note 23, at 7.
50. Id. at 7-9.
51. Linda Zagzebski, for example, refers to “[t]he traditional proposal that
knowledge is true belief based upon good reasons . . . .” Linda Zagzebski, What
is Knowledge?, in T HE B LACKWEL L GUIDE TO EPISTEMOLOG Y 92, 95 (John Greco &
Ernest Sosa eds., 1999).
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reality, and is a coherent statement to one who believes
that no such reality exists, as well as to one who believes to
the contrary.
If “knowledge” denotes truth, its existence cannot be
verified. 52 “I may know, but do I know (or only believe) that
I know; if I do (know), do I know (or only believe) that I
know that I know;” et seq.—but it can be believed with
greater and greater justification. The assertion that one
“knows” is a functional claim, asserting that the extent of
persisting uncertainty is of no existential or decisional
significance. Conceptually, it may be faulted as analogous
to taking a last step to disregard or overpower (rather than
respect or transcend) Zeno‟s Paradox: If, having begun in
Philadelphia, I successively travel one-half of the distance
to Ann Arbor 100 times, it is “true” that I am not yet there,
but I may nonetheless have a compelling reason to act as if
I am, and no reason to act as if I am not. Indeed, in most
circumstances, to say that I am not yet there would simply
be a bit of pedantry, even though neither inductively nor
deductively can the gap remaining be bridged.
The millions of people who would join Job in insisting,
“I know that my Redeemer liveth,” 53 have taken that “last
step” as their first, by reason of religious faith. Faith may
ground certainty, as may love (and perhaps even hope), but
reason cannot.54 Martha Nussbaum, writing of “Love‟s
Knowledge,” terms that condition “cataleptic”: “The
cataleptic impression is said to have the power,” she writes,
“just through its own felt quality, to drag us to assent, to
52. What Jeremy Waldron writes about justice is more broadly apt: “No
matter how often or emphatically we deploy words like „objective,‟ a claim about
what justice objectively requires never appears except as someone‟s view . . . .
Although there may be an objective truth about justice . . . it inevitably comes to
us as one contestant view among others.” Jeremy Waldron, The Circumstances
of Integrity, 3 LEG AL THEO RY 1, 13 (1997).
53. Job 19:25 (emphasis added).
54. Arthur Leff again remains persuasive:
One would think that a fully considered moral position, the product of
deep and thorough intellectual activity, one that fits together into a
fairly consistent whole, would deserve more respect than shallow,
expletive, internally inconsistent ethical decisions. Alas, to think that
would be to think wrong: labor and logic have no necessary connection
to ethical truth.
Leff, supra note 21, at 1238.
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convince us that things could not be otherwise.” 55 One may
then be speaking loosely of “certainty,” yet have warrant for
the avowal.
But certainty is necessarily a condition that describes
the stance toward reality of the person-believing (or
knowing). It cannot be a statement about the world external
to the speaker, for no one has unmediated access to reality
or unmediated access to anyone else‟s assertion of such
access. 56 Even Euclid never “looked on Reality bare.” 57
To the “certain” believer—whether the source of
certainty is faith, love, or reason—it will not appear so, and
for him or her to speak as if nothing has been said about
55. M ART HA C. N USSBAUM , Love‟s Knowledge,
ON PHIL OSOP HY AND LITE RATURE 261, 265 (1990).

in LOVE ‟S KNOWLEDGE : ESS AYS

56. Access to another‟s claim is necessarily mediated by belief in the truth of
the other‟s access. Robert Bellah felicitously asserts, “[t]here is no truth that
truths itself,” Robert N. Bellah, At Home and Not At Home: Religious Pluralism
and Religious Truth, C HRISTI AN CENTURY, Apr. 19, 1995, at 425; and David
Luban terms revelation “esoteric,” in the sense that “to rely on it is to have faith
in the prophets who communicate the revelation.” David Luban, A Theological
Argument Against Theopolitics, 16 INST . FO R P HIL. & P UB. PO L‟ Y REP. 10, 13
(1996). Jeff Powell describes the opposition of seventeenth century British
Protestants to any exposition of Scripture that “went beyond the text [as], of
necessity, a „human invention,‟ „which a discreet Man may do well; but ‟tis his
Scripture, not the Holy Ghost[‟s]‟.” H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV . L. R EV . 885, 889-90 (1985) (quoting
JOHN S ELDE N, T ABLE -TALK: BEING T HE DISCOURSE OF J O HN S ELDEN ESQ. 45
(1699)). One of the most famous teachings of George Fox, founder of the
Religious Society of Friends, challenges those whose “knowledge” of God is not
based on direct personal experience but on the witness of others (even those
who, in his mind, were History‟s highest witnesses to Truth). Margaret Fell, an
early supporter and later his wife, reports first hearing Fox preach in these
words:
[T]he scriptures were the prophets‟ words, and Christ‟s and the
apostles‟ words, and what as they spoke they enjoyed and possessed,
and had it from the Lord . . . [t]hen what had any to do with the
scriptures, but as they came to the spirit that gave them forth. You will
say, Christ saith this, and the apostles say this; but what canst thou
say? . . . [W]hat thou speakest, is it inwardly from God?
Margaret Fox, The Testimony of Margaret Fox , in 1 THE WO RKS OF GEO RGE FO X
49, 50 (1975). On hearing this, Margaret Fox “cried bitterly. . .„[w]e are all
thieves, we are all thieves, we have taken the scriptures in words, and know
nothing of them in ourselves.‟” Id.
57. Edna St. Vincent Millay may have led us to understate the matter, I am
suggesting, when she began a sonnet, “Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare.”
ED NA S T. V INCENT M ILL AY , Euclid Alone has Looked on Beauty Bare, in THE
S ELECTED POETRY OF ED NA S T. V INCENT M ILLAY 155 (2001).
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“reality bare” is to belie that certainty. It cannot be
inherently improper to refuse to do so. Yet, there is a
boundary, I suggest, the crossing of which is not justified by
certainty of belief. I will use the term triumphalism to
describe that which lies across that boundary, and turn now
to its exploration.
VI. TRIUMPHALISM
To me, the essence of triumphalism—whether in
religion, nationalism, or any other profound source of
values58—is the movement beyond holding a set of beliefs as
“known,” as to be true and certain, to maintaining that such
certainty suffices to delegitimate any claim that the
contrary belief of another may be justified. That is just the
difference that Robert Bolt‟s Sir Thomas More (as quoted in
the epigraph to this Essay) realized and, after a momentary
spontaneous lapse, respected regarding his commitment to
the truth of the Papal claim to the authority given by Jesus
to St. Peter. More would not take an oath avowing that
which contradicted his actual belief. It was the fact of his
belief, and not the truth of its foundation (although he
believed it to be true), that was dispositive.
More was confronting a dissonance between his speech
(the oath) 59 and his beliefs. More typically, the conflict is
between the sense of certainty about the truth of one‟s
beliefs and the fact that others question their truth (and
what may follow from them). Clifford Geertz has described
felicitously the reason why conversation in that context is
challenging. He writes of “the collection of notions a people
has of how reality is at base put together” as its world view,
and the “general style of . . . the way they do things and like
to see things done” as its ethos. 60 He describes “the office of
religious symbols” as to “render the world view believable
58. The primary example of the merging of nationalist and religious grounds
is Israel, as its renewed existence (after 1900 years) and continued survival is
understood by many Jews (and Christians). Certain varieties of “American
exceptionalism” fit this model, usually (although perhaps not necessarily)
through a religious foundation, which sees this country as in some unexplained
way the special object of providential care. I will not address the phenomenon of
nationalist triumphalism, whether religiously based or not.
59. “What is an oath but words we say to God?” B OLT , supra note 1, at 140.
60. GEERT Z, supra note 34, at 97.
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and the ethos justifiable . . . by invoking each in support of
the other,” 61 and observes:
Seen from outside the religious perspective, this sort of hanging a
picture from a nail driven into its frame appears as a kind of
sleight of hand. Seen from inside, it appears as a sim ple fact. . . .
[R]eligious beliefs . . . are regarded as being not conclusions from
experience . . . but as being prior to it. F or those who hold them,
religious beliefs are not inductive, they are paradigmatic; the
world . . . provides not evidences for their truth but illustrations of
it. They are a light cast upon human life from somewhere outside
it. 62

What to the believer is obvious, to the skeptic is simple
question-begging. What the one sees in the other as
obduracy (or worse), the other sees in the one as
triumphalism (or worse). The willingness to entertain the
possibility that one‟s fundamental avowals are in error is to
one a fateful step on a dark and slippery road to apostasy;
the unwillingness to take that step is to the other a mark of
subjection (nascent or full-blown) to “tyranny over the
mind.” 63
Alvin Plantinga, defending the ethical permissibility of
believing that his religion is true and that other beliefs,
when contrary to it, are false, observes:
I must concede that there are a variety of ways in which I can be
and have been intellectually arrogant and egotistic; I have
certainly fallen into this vice in the past and no doubt am not free
of it now. But am I really arrogant and egotistic just by virtue of
believing what I know others don‟t believe, where I can‟t show

61. Id.
62. Id. at 97-98. Note that what Geertz denies regarding religious beliefs is
not their foundation in experience, but that they embody “conclusions from
experience.” Id. at 98. The grounding “paradigm” may be an “experience,” but it
is not itself the product of reflection. Quakers claim that faith can be grounded
on each person‟s direct unmediated experience of the Divine Presence. See Fox,
supra note 56.
63. On the wall of the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C., is the
inscription: “I have sworn upon the alter of God eternal hostility against every
form of tyranny over t he mind of man.” Thomas Jefferson Memorial: Statue
Chamber Inscriptions, http://www.nps.gov/archi ve/t hje/memorial/i nscript.htm
(last visited Oct . 8, 2007).
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them that I am right? 64

The problem, however, is deeper than the presence or
absence of such ethically dubious personality traits as
arrogance or egotism. Some—not all, but some—religious
people regard their faith as primarily concerning the truth
of certain propositions about the nature of reality, including
the authority of religious texts or institutions to express or
propound such truths and their moral implications. 65 Part
of that set of beliefs is often a felt obligation to be
exceedingly wary of attempts to be persuaded to violate one
or more of the norms of their faith. 66 It is also true that, for
many believers, the matter is not one of conscious will, for
they do not regard their assent as a voluntary decision.
Paul Griffiths has described the experience of such people
this way:
[T]here is a long (and usually com plicated) story to be told about
why I find myself involuntarily moved to assent to these claim s at
a particular time. Usually, that story will involve reference to
habits, skills, and knowledge I‟ve gained in the past, but in all
cases the upshot is the sam e: I find myself irresistibly moved to
assent . . . . I cannot deliberate and then decide whether to believe
it or not. When I find myself assenting to som e claim (believing it,
taking it as true), then, my assent typically does not involve choice
or deliberation. It is simply given to m e. 67

64. Alvin Plantinga, Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism, in THE
RATIONALIT Y OF B ELIEF AND T HE PL URALITY OF FAIT H : ESSAYS IN HO NO R O F
WILLIAM P. ALSTON 191, 200 (Thomas D. Senor ed., 1995) (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., PAUL J. G RIFFIT HS , A N APO LOG Y FO R APOL OGETICS : A S TUD Y IN
LOGIC O F INTERRELIGIO US DIALOG UE 9-12 (1991). For a capsule description of
contending approaches, see supra note 20.
THE

66. For some (not all) such people, more is at stake than the outcome of a
disagreement, more or less friendly, about a matter of metaphysics, ethics or
public policy. In the friendly disputant‟s expressions may be heard the voice of
Satan. Of course, holding the belief that the beliefs of another person (or worse,
a person who holds to such beliefs) are the work of the Devil is a moral hazard,
and might lead the believer into seriously wrongful speech or conduct. Wariness
is therefore an appropriate response; a preemptive dismissal is not. The one so
believing will assert the defense of truth as justification, which the other will
regard as compounding the felony. That this leads to an infinite regress is a
problem, but that observation is not a solution to the problem.
67. PAUL J. G RIFFIT HS , P RO BLEMS OF RELIGIO US DIVERSITY 26 (2001). An
elaboration of this phenomenon, more textured than Griffiths‟s but with a very
similar final lesson for non-believers, has been articulated by Jewish theologian
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Non-religious people should therefore be cautious
about dismissing as triumphalist or impositional the
reluctance or unwillingness of some (again, not all, but
some) religious believers to find legitimacy or (in some
sense) validity of other religions, to acknowledge that
others may have justification for holding their
understanding of the truth, or to engage in “dialogue”
about matters of belief (or morality grounded in belief)
with those who disagree. 68 All other things being equal,
openness to dialogue across difference is, in my judgment, a
good, but it is not inherently a universal moral imperative,
and all else is not always equal. 69 The matter turns on the
specifics of the individual actor‟s motivation, intention ,
and—especially—actions. Imposition is a serious wrong; a
triumphalist attitude alone may best be thought of as
simply a source of interpersonal incompatibility.
However, triumphalist attitudes tend to leach into
Neil Gillman:
What distinguishes the “insider” from the “outsider” is that for the
former, the whole coheres in an ultimately satisfying way. . . . [M]ost of
the major religions are rich and variegated enough . . . that as a whole,
the tradition still works for many . . . . How all of this works itself out
in the life experience of a ny one indi vidual is subtl e and complex.
But . . . [t]he decision can not be made from the outside. Religious
commitments are probably the most existential issues we face. We
have to be prepared to jump in and live within a tradition before we
can appreciate its strengths and weaknesses.
NEIL GILLMAN, S ACRED FRAGMENTS : RECOVE RING T HEOLOG Y FO R THE M ODERN
JEW 33-34 (1990). For a discussion of the way in which the process “works” in
primarily an experiential rather than a cognitive way, see M ARK S. M ASSA,
CATHOLICS AND AMERI CAN C ULT URE 156-58 (1999) (discussing the work of Emile
Durkheim as a “social scientific version of one of the most ancient and revered
Christian dictums . . . lex orandi lex credendi . . . „the law of praying founds the
law of believing‟”).
68. For a clear and (in my judgment) fair-minded introduction to the variety
of views about the stance that Christian traditions and individuals should take
toward other religions—a subject that has produced a voluminous literature—
see generally PAUL F. K NITTER , NO OT HE R NAME ?: A C RITICAL S URVEY O F
CHRISTI AN ATTIT UDES TOWARD T HE WORL D R ELIGIONS (1985).
69. For the classic statement of the traditional Jewish wariness about
“dialogue” with Christians, see Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Confrontation, 6
TRADITION 5 (1964). Rabbi Soloveitchik wrote just as significant change was
about to appear. See Eugene B. Borowitz, A Nearness in Difference: JewishChristian Dialogue Since Vatican II, COMMONWEAL , Jan. 13, 2006, at 17, 19-20
(describing the author‟s experience of the radical change over the past four
decades in the setting in whi ch Jewish-Christian dialogue takes place).
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actions. Indeed, the expression of an attitude is itself an
action, in the practical sense that it can “pinch” those who
do not share its wellsprings. This, I believe, is the core of
the problem of the appropriateness of certain forms of
public prayer: What to the devout may be simply a
legitimate desire to express deep-seated feelings of
gratitude or dependency on “He from whom all blessings
flow,” when joined by a large percentage of the like-minded
cannot help but constrain the freedom of those who differ. 70
More broadly, “certain” believers need to realize that
their certainty, like the belief to which it relates, is “theirs,”
not only in the sense that it is an aspect of their identity,
but that it cannot escape its boundary in the self. As a
statement about the world, it may well be true but its truth
(like all such truths) is not verifiable. 71 Donald Davidson‟s
dictum (a portion of which is quoted in the epigraph to this
Essay) seems on point to me: “What distinguishes a
coherence theory [which Davidson espouses] is simply the
claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief
except another belief.” 72 At the same time—and for the
70. Cf. Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in Public Life—Reasons for Minimal
Access, 60 GEO. W ASH . L. REV . 633, 633-43 (1992). Judge Frankel asks, “Why . . .
the proliferation of committees and public officials insisting that crèches be
placed . . . on the public squares?” He answers, “[t]he reason . . . is exactly to
show those others who‟s boss. This is Christian country. If you don‟t like it, as
you presumably don‟t, you know what you can do.” Id. at 639. The issue is not
resolvable, in my view, by a judicial judgment about the presence or absence of
“coercion.” The concept is hostage to the Supreme Court ‟s deep divisions about
its meaning. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), for the conflicting
approaches espoused by Justice Kennedy for the Court, id. at 580, and Justice
Scalia for four dissenters, id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the
problem is deeper than that. As Stephen Gey wisely comments: “The choice
seems to be between a narrow version of coercion theory, which produces
coherent but unacceptable results, or a broad version . . . which is incoherent
and unpredictable but [potentially] compatible with . . . religious liberty.”
S TEPHEN GEY, RELIGION AND T HE S TATE 247 (2d ed. 2006). More fundamentally,
an occasional retrospective adversarial adjudication, whether focused on motive
or effect, is inherently incapable of resolving the dispute satisfactorily.
71. See supra text accompanying note 52.
72. DAVIDSO N, supra note 2, at 141. To a similar effect is Sanford Levinson:
If someone argues to me that God requires X, whether X be social
justice for the poor or the prohibition of eating pork, it simply cannot
count as a reason for my doing X unless I share a view of the world that
includes both the ontological reality of God‟s existence and the
epistemological possibility of ascertaining divine desire.
Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 M ICH. L. R EV .
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same reason—the “justification” that others may have for
their conflicting beliefs does not contradict the believers‟
own certainty, since justification makes no truth claim. The
two incompatible beliefs may therefore reside, compatibly,
though uncomfortably, alongside one another.
A special complexity arises because of the need to
consider the proper reach of the principle that members of a
religious community may claim the right, free of adverse
judgment from those who are not members, to attempt to
keep “the faithful” faithful. I grew up feeling quite
aggrieved by what I regarded as the efforts of the Roman
Catholic Church to induce the polity to adopt its views
regarding such matters as the censorship of movies,
restrictions on the sale of contraceptives, and the
availability of several varieties of medical intervention in
life-threatening emergencies. I now see those past efforts as
not so much aimed at me and other non-Catholics than as
primarily reflecting the Church‟s concern for the moral
environment of its communicants, increasingly attracted by
the blandishments of a society responsive to other voices on
moral issues. 73 Whether and how a religious leader is
obliged to keep in mind and make clear what his intended
audience is, and to take responsibility for the wider scope of
his predictable audience, 74 is a singularly elusive question.
To articulate the problem in the terms I have does not
imply that a religious community may not police its
boundaries by setting conditions on the permissibility of
actions (or even speech) of its communicants as a condition
1872, 1879 (1994).
73. Steven Smith ably describes “The Spiritual Hazards of Religious
Pluralism” from the perspective of t he “devout believer,” i n a chapt er titled,
The (Compelling?) Case for Religious Intolerance, i n S TEVEN D. S MIT H ,
GETTI NG OVER EQ UALIT Y: A C RITI CAL DI AG NOSIS OF R ELIGIO US F REED OM I N
AMERICA 144, 152-58 (2001).
74. Pope Benedict XV I, on the eve of his election to that office, made the
statement I quoted earlier (and have quarreled with) in a Homily during a
Mass, a central moment in what is ordinarily a deeply private religious service.
Supra note 9; supra text accompanying note 17. Yet his words were,
predictably, almost instantly transmitted throughout the world—to millions of
Catholics, to be sure, but to millions of non-Catholics as well. Similarly, an
essay of his titled, Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today, was first
delivered to a gathering of Roman Catholic Bishops, but has been (foreseeably)
widely read. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Relativism: The Central Problem for
Faith Today, 26 O RIGINS 309 (1996).
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of membership. 75 Nor does it presume that such a
community (or an individual member) should not seek to
influence the polity at large, in an effort to bring the civil
law, binding on all, into correspondence with its moral
beliefs on a matter. In my judgment, it is as appropriate for
such a community to do that as for any participant in the
polity. 76 Individuals and institutions, religious and secular
alike, are entitled to contend for a voice in setting public
norms, whether cultural or legal.
However, questions of the appropriateness and
justification of such efforts, and the actors‟ responsibilities
for adverse consequences on the quality of public life, are
not exhausted by the issue of entitlement. Today, when
examples such as censorship of movies and access to birth
control are no longer at center stage, the issue remains. The
adversarial manner in which Pope John Paul II engaged
what he called “the culture of death” 77 perhaps reflected a
concern (shared by many Protestants, Jews, and Muslims,
as well as not a few non-believers) with the moral climate of
contemporary society, especially its effect on the practices of
Roman Catholics. However, he described his teachings as
embodying moral norms accessible through reason and
therefore binding on all persons.78 Although, to that extent,
75. Whether and when some forms of inducements (such as shunning, in
insular communities), even if addressed only to co-religionists, press too hard
upon the limits of that interest, is a separate question.
76. Happily, I do not rega rd the validity of that judgment as within the
scope of this Essay. See, from among a torrent of writing on the subject, KENT
GREENAW ALT , P RIVATE CONS CIENCES AND PUBLI C R EASO N (1995); KENT
GREENAW ALT , RELIGIOUS CONVICTIO NS AND POLITI CAL CHOICE (1988).
77. See, e.g., POPE J OHN PAUL II, T HE GOSPEL OF LIFE [EVANG ELI UM VITAE] §
28, at 50 (1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/hol y_father/john_paul_ii /
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html (“[W]e are
facing an enormous and dramatic clash between good and evil, death and life,
the „culture of death‟ and the „culture of life.‟”).
78. See, e.g., id. § 2, at 4-5:
The Church knows that this Gospel of life, which she has received from
her Lord, has a profound and persuasive echo in the heart of every
person—believer and non-believer alike . . . . [E]very person sincerely
open to truth and goodness can, by the light of reason and the hidden
action of grace, come to recognize in the natural law written in the
heart . . . the sacred value of human life . . . and can affirm the right of
every human being to have this primary good respected to the highest
degree. Upon the recognition of this right, every human community
and the political community itself are founded.
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he spoke outside of the “certainty” of revelation, all who
differed were denounced as “relativists,” whatever their
objections to the morality of his “culture of life,” and
regardless of the secular or religious grounding of those
objections.
The reflexive move from a judgment of immorality to
the espousal of regulation or prohibition by the secular law
is an especially problematic move. Being certain of the
truth of one‟s beliefs, rejecting the thought of dialogue
with those who differ, refusal to entertain the possibility
that they might be justified in their beliefs—all these
might be justified as authentic, conscientiously held points
of view. Invoking the power of the Sta te to constrain, or
even place at risk, the lives of others for their failure to see
the world that way is quite another step. This is a large
and complex area, and there would be no utility in my
cataloguing my own evaluation of specific morally
grounded public policy overtures. I mean only to claim
validity for a genuine caution, and respect for diffe rence,
by those seeking to see public law adopt their
understanding of moral truth. It is one thing to oppose the
decriminalization of post-viability abortion; it is quite
another to encourage pharmacists (especially on a broad
scale or in areas lacking a plenitude of consumer choices)
to refuse to fill prescriptions for “morning after” or birth
control pills, on the ground that they are illicit methods of
contraception or “abortifacients.” 79
For a measured description and appraisal, see James F. Childress, Moral
Rhetoric and Moral Reasoning: Some Reflections on Evangelium V itae, in
CHOOSING LIFE : A DIALOG UE ON E VANG ELI UM VITAE 21, 28-32 (Kevin Wm. Wildes
& Alan C. Mitchell eds., 1997) (analyzing the Pope‟s “metaphor of war, enemy,
conspiracy, and so forth”).
79. A number of scholars writing out of the Roman Catholic tradition have
expressed measured reflections on the emergent approach of the Vatican.
Herminio Rico‟s study, John Paul II and the Legacy of Dignitatis Humanae is a
carefully nuanced, sympathetic-yet-critical, account of Pope John Paul‟s
preference for “the seeking of direct political influence” over “the patient
formation of consciences and, though that change, achieving the transformation
of the social consensus.” R ICO, supra note 4, at 169-76. David Hollenbach
grounds in the work of John Courtney Murray an eloquent case for “intellectual
humility” in engaging with the “full array of intellectual currents present in
culture” today. D AVID HOLLE NBACH, T HE G LO BAL F ACE OF P UBLIC FAIT H :
POLITICS , H UM AN RIG HTS , AND C HRISTI AN ET HI CS 142 (2003). “The virtue of
society,” he maintains,
is built from the bottom up, not mandated from the top down, and it is
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Moreover, it is far from clear whether, and how far, the
institutional interest in keeping the “flock” from straying
justifiably applies to a communicant‟s participation in
public life. Examples are strongly worded pastoral
admonitions, whether coming from a Catholic prelate or an
Orthodox Rabbi, to vote in public elections a certain way,
and selective applications of internal sanctions to highly
visible members of its faith community who hold, or are
seeking, public office. 80
The rapidity and scope of the changes in prevailing
norms of morality in many aspects of public and private
life—too rapid and broad-ranging for some, too slow and
limited for others—have produced vast areas of resentment
and anger, further poisoning the atmosphere and making
nearly everyone feel unheard and disentitled. In the context
of that maelstrom, an attempt to unravel the multiple
threads that should properly be brought to bear on more-orless public discourse may seem simply naïve. The narrow
question I am considering here is whether one may justly
complain of any input into public policy, not that it is
religiously motivated, but that the attempt to gain support
for a contested moral position by attacking relativism may
be a demagogic diversion of attention from the merits of the
question or a triumphalist constriction of the possibility of
conscientious disagreement regarding them.
built by citizens who take responsibility for their lives and for the well being of society through active participation in public life. A
fundamental element of this social well-being is a robust commitment
to the freedom of one‟s fellow-citizens.
Id. at 139. For additional thoughtful analyses from within the Catholic
tradition, see M. Cathleen Kaveny, The Limits of Ordinary Virtue: The Limits of
the Criminal Law in Implementing Evangelium V itae, in C HOOSING LIFE : A
DIALO GUE ON EVANG ELI UM VI TAE, supra note 77, at 132; Todd David Whitmore,
What Would John Courtney Murray Say?: On Abortion and Euthanasia ,
COMMONWEAL , Oct. 7, 1994, at 16. Writing from an Evangelical Protestant
perspective, David Skeel and William Stuntz have developed a sophi sticated
case for great restraint in moving from moral to legal prohibitions. David A.
Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 809 (2006).
80. For a sensitive and careful approach to this question from a Roman
Catholic perspective, see Amelia J. Uelmen, The Spirituality of Communion: A
Resource for Dialogue with Catholics in Public Life, 43 C ATH . L AW. 289, 305-08
(2004). The difficulty is compounded as to members of religious traditions
whose leaders do not simply counsel their communicants on public issues, but
whose theology makes the counsel binding on their actions.
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The contours of the frontier that I have sought to
describe are less substantive than attitudinal. They reflect
the concerns I have expressed: the use of “anti-relativism”
as a rhetorical diversion of the discourse, and the practice
(which I have termed triumphalism) of going beyond the
assertion of a certain commitment to the truth of a moral
belief, to scornful dismissal of the possibility that others
may be justified in believing otherwise. Whether such
cautions have a greater capacity than substantive ones to
penetrate the maelstrom is not altogether clear.
VII. MORAL REALISM
I want now to turn from claims to “know” the truth of a
moral matter to issues raised by one making no such highly
confident claim, but still asserting a justified belief about a
disputed moral claim. To believe something, in the sense I
am using the term here, is to think that it is probably
true. 81 The belief in question may be based on a hunch, an
isolated intuition, or simply a habit of some kind. On
examination, one may find no special reason to prefer it
over its denial, but in the absence of a felt need for inquiry
or an encounter with an occasion for skepticism, it simply
resides in the mind undisturbed, if only for the time being.
Justification for belief requires something more. I
cannot attempt here—or, truth be told, anywhere—a
developed expression of the conditions that constitute
justification for belief. Suffice it to say that I find
persuasive the approach suggested by John Rawls‟s notion
of “considered judgment in reflective equilibrium.” 82 What I
understand by that state is that the belief in question has a
stabilizing and resonating coherence with my overall
understanding of the world and my place in it, and
specifically with my overall moral judgments. As I
suggested earlier,83 justified belief differs from knowledge
81. I am speaking of “belief” in the sense of what has been termed “b elief
that,” as distinguished from “belief in,” which connotes trust or commitment.
Many assert that religious belief is more properly seen as of that latter kind.
See, e.g., M ARCUS BORG, T HE HEART OF CHRISTIANIT Y: REDISCOVERI NG A LIFE OF
FAIT H 25-42 (2004). Compare the differing views described supra note 20.
82. J OHN RAW LS , A T HEO RY OF J USTICE 46 (1971); see also id. at 46-53
(presenting a fuller discussion of Rawls‟s approach).
83. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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because knowledge (in the sense that seems most useful to
me) denotes truth, which is a metaphysical and not merely
an epistemological concept, and cannot be verified. While
both a relativist and a realist may speak in a similar way of
justified belief, they differ in that the former can assert that
two inconsistent beliefs may each be “true” for one of two
belief-holders, while the realist‟s assertion would be that
both beliefs may be justified, but no more than one can be
true.
This is not the place, and I am not the person, for a full
presentation of the case for believing (and believing oneself
justified in believing) that moral realism is true.
Nonetheless, since I have made extensive use of the notion,
and have made it somewhat relevant to the burden of this
Essay to assert that I am not a relativist, I think it
warranted, perhaps required, that I offer a summary of the
considerations that ground my beliefs. All of them are
relevant, some more weighty than others; together I find
them a persuasive set.
It bears noting, first, that my moral claims appear to be
statements about a state of affairs that exists outside of my
perceptions of it (although that statement is, of course, a
perception of mine). More importantly (since a relativist
might understand his or her moral claims in that general
way), it seems to be the case that my own (like others‟)
beliefs as to the right and wrong of a matter tend to be
bound up in an underlying conviction that those beliefs are
actually true. A person asserting that a certain act is right
(or wrong) does not ordinarily appear simply to be telling us
something about himself or herself, or his or her affinity
group.84
It is also the case that awareness of the variousness of
moral norms and their evolution across time and cultures
may (as an empirical matter) be the cause of relativist
beliefs, but it does not logically imply it. Indeed, despite the
84. As Sidney Morgenbesser notes, “the person is attempting
simultaneously to affirm something about his own approvals, and also to claim
that if the person addressed knew of certain factors or if he underwent certain
experiences, he would agree with him in attitude.” Sidney Morgenbesser,
Approaches to Ethical Objectivity, in M ORAL ED UCATIO N 72, 77 (Barry I.
Chazan & Jonas J. Soltis eds., 1973). The word “certain” is so open-textured
that I ca n agree with Morgenbesser, although I suspect t hat my list of
necessary “factors” and “experiences” would be longer than his.
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salience of that awareness, I think it less significant than
the existence of a startling amount of moral agreement. 85
Beyond that, exploration of the bases of change and
divergence themselves actually supports realist premises. It
places the question in context to think about the issue as it
comes up in the scientific realm. John Searle notes 86 that
the fact that “scientific revolutions” take place supports,
rather than undermines, belief in mind-independent truth:
“[W]e would not bother to change our account from classical
physics to relativity physics except on the presupposition
that there is a way the universe really is, and we are trying
to get as close as we can to stating how it is.” 87 In the moral
arena, Richard Shweder and Jeffrey Stout have
persuasively undermined reliance on two classic situations
proffered as counter-examples of the reality of moral truth.
Their analyses are powerful and the lessons they draw are
of general import.
Shweder considers Richard Posner‟s claim that the
context in which infanticide and slavery were practiced in
the ancient world made them morally appropriate, and that
such a realization implies the truth of relativism. Posner
reasoned:
Infanticide is abhorred in our culture, but routine in societies that
lack the resources to feed all the children that are born. Slavery is
routine when the victors in war cannot afford to feed or free their
captives, so that the alternative to slavery is death . . . . It is
provincial to say that “we are right about slavery . . . and the
Greeks wrong,” so different was slavery in the ancient world from
racial enslavement, as practiced, for exam ple, in the United States
until the end of the Civil War, and so different were the material
conditions that nurtured these different forms of slavery . . . . The
inhabitants of an infanticidal or slave society would say with equal

85. For excellent examples of articulation of the presence of a n im portant
core of intercultural agreement on the fu ndamental norms of morality, see
S ISSELA BO K, C OMMO N V AL UES 13-19 (1995); Richard Shweder, Moral Realism
Without the Ethnocentrism: Is it Just a List of Empty Truisms?, in H UM AN
RIGHTS WI T H M ODEST Y: T HE PRO BLEM OF U NIVERS ALISM 65 (Andras Sajo ed.,
2004).
86. The term Searl e uses is “external realism,” by whi ch he means t hat
“there exists a way that thi ngs are that is independent of our represent ations
of how things are.” John Searle, Reality and Relativism: Shweder on a Which?
Hunt, 6 ANTHROP OLO GICAL THE O RY 112 (2006).
87. Id. at 113.
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plausibility that infanticide or slavery is presumptively good,
though they might allow that the pr esum ption could be rebutted in
peaceable, wealthy, techn ologically com plex societies. 88

Far from seeing these culture-specific differences as
probative of the truth of relativism, Shweder draws from
Posner‟s explanations just the opposite lesson:
Judge Posner constructs and interprets both infanticide and
slavery . . . as cases that are intelligible as morally valid practices .
. . by representing each practice as a m eans to a universally
recognized moral good—nam ely the reduction of physical harm (to
already born children and to the slaves themselves, respectively). .
..
Posner‟s argum ent is potentially persuasive because he is able to
direct our attention to the moral integrity of local contexts; and
those local contexts become morally intelligible precisely bec ause
he can presuppose and thus trade on our common sense revelation
of a base set of moral truths. . . .
The correctness of a m oral judgment may well be relative to
circumstances. Nevertheless, im plicit in Posner‟s argum ent is the
idea that . . . with an inform ed understanding of the local scene
any rational person should be able to recognize those practices, in
those instances and under those circumstances, as local
instantiations of some universal moral ideal . . . .89

Stout considers Sartre‟s famous account of the young
man who had to choose between supporting his aged
mother and joining the French Resistance, which Sartre
characterizes as “supporting the conclusion that moral
judgments express unreasoned choices.” 90 “Yet,” Stout goes
on:
Sartre is able to paint the dilemma in considerable detail, and
each detail is itself a sam ple of the moral knowledge that Sartre is
trying to deny us. In showing or saying that one consideration
balances another he reveals his own recognition of the nature and
force of the various considerations, and appeals to our own
recognition of their nature and force. Dilemmas of this kind show
88. Richard Posner, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics
of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 H ARV . L. R EV . 1637, 1650-51 (1998).
89. Shweder, supra note 85, at 88-89.
90. S TOUT , supra note 47, at 46. Such a view is not relativism, for it suggests
the absence of even a relative-to-circumstances basis for rational preference,
but has in common with it a denial of the realist claim —a susceptibility to the
response that Stout makes in the passage in the text. Id.
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us, sometim es quite vividly and poignantly, where our moral
uncertainties, and thus our probable areas of moral disagreement,
are. But they don‟t show that there‟s no such thing as moral truth
or justified moral belief. In fact . . . they trade on the assumption
that certain m oral beliefs are justified and true in making their
point. 91

How far Stout‟s argument carries one implicates the
question whether moral discernment “runs out,” as it were,
so that as to some highly specific questions there is no
“right answer.” I consider that question briefly below. 92
In considering the weight of these factors, it is
important to realize that much of the resistance to the
acceptance of moral realism is supported by the attachment
to it of the baggage of several thoughts or qualities that
(rightly) seem dubious, but which are plainly separable. I
here address five:
(i) To speak of the “existence” of moral truth is not to
assert that, in Thomas Nagel‟s words, “they must be real
objects of some other kind.” 93 Interestingly enough, the
same mistaken assumption is made, by believers and
skeptics alike, about the necessary meaning of an avowal of
the existence of God. Gordon Kaufman writes of the need to
“de-reify” God-language:
[D]evotion to the “creator/lord” today should be understood as
consisting in the attempt to live in rapport with the movem ents of
life and history that provide the actual context of our human
existence; it is to attempt to be in tune with what we discern as
the nature of things . . . .94

Writing out of the tradition of Reconstructionist
Judaism, Rabbi Harold Kushner observes: “God is not an
entity out in space somewhere[;]” 95 the question of God‟s
91. Id. at 46-47.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 101-08.
93. THOM AS N AGEL, T HE V IEW FROM NOW HE RE 144 (1986). I find Nagel‟s
succinct discussion of realism and anti-realism cogent and persuasive. Id. at
138-52.
94. Gordon D. Kaufman, Reconstructing the Concept of God: De-reifying the
Anthropomorphisms, in THE M AKING AND R EMAKING OF C HRISTI AN DO CT RINE 96,
102 (Sarah Coakley & David A. Pailin eds., 1993).
95. HAROL D KUS HNE R, WHE N CHILD REN ASK ABOUT GOD 98 (1976).
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existence need not be thought of as one “about the
population of Heaven.” 96
One may reject these theological views and yet
recognize that the traditional assumption confuses the
familiar and the essential, whether the question arises with
respect to religious or philosophical language.
(ii) John Finnis is perhaps the best-known contemporary
philosopher who espouses a morality of “exceptionless
norms.”97 The classic expression of such an approach is Kant‟s
assertion of an obligation to tell the truth to a would-be
murderer who has asked one for the whereabouts of his or
her intended victim.98 While one holding such a view of
morality would probably be a realist, it is neither logically
nor empirically true that moral realism entails, or even
inherently tends toward, such an avowal. The existence of
mind-independent truth is a different matter from the
question of its content, and recognition that a moral
judgment should be nuanced, qualified, or context-specific
makes its truth more difficult to discern and articulate, and
multiplies points of potential disagreement, but it doesn‟t
introduce a subjectivity that was not otherwise warranted.
One may say that Kant is right in asserting a broad
deontological justification for the immorality of lying, and
nonetheless dispute his application of it to the instance
stated. 99 Insisting on drawing the line at telling the truth to
would-be murderers applies, rather than eliminates, an
asserted distinction between right and wrong.
(iii) Realist metaphysics is not at all inconsistent with
uncertainty about the correctness of particularized moral
judgments. Indeed, a coherentist conception of justification
for belief 100 implies the possible existence of circumstances
96. Id. at 56.
97. J OHN FINNIS , M O RAL ABSO LUTES : TRADITIO N, REVISION, AND TRUT H 1-6
(1991).
98. See Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of
Philanthropic Concerns, in G RO UNDING FO R THE M ETAPHYSICS OF M O RALS 63, 63
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ‟g Co. 1993) (1785).
99. See Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 IS R. L. R EV .
280, 315-16 (1989); see also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, What is Meant By „Telling the
Truth‟?, in LYI NG: M ORAL CHOI CE IN PUBLIC AND P RIVATE LIFE 262, 264 (Sissela
Bok ed., 1989).
100. See supra notes 82-84 and a ccompanying text.
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in which the complexity or subtlety of the factors that bear
on a moral question, and the limits of the evaluator‟s access
to knowledge of some of those factors, make uncertainty in
application wholly predictable and wholly appropriate. If I
may be forgiven for an egregious mix of metaphors, that we
“see through a glass, darkly” does not imply that “there is
no there there.” Jeffrey Stout puts the matter more
elegantly: “We should not confuse doubting that there is a
single best thing to do in a given case with doubting that
there is a moral truth with respect to that case.” 101
This question is presented, although not resolved, if one
rejects (in the case at hand, or in general) blanket
condemnation (a la Finnis) of a given act regardless of
considerations of justification. Abortion is, of course, the
premier case in point. To one who finds the act of
intentionally inducing an abortion to be illicit without
regard to any further considerations—whether from the
moment of conception, the end of the possibility of
“twinning,” the fortieth day of pregnancy, the onset of
viability, or any other assertedly critical moment in fetal
development—the issue of uncertainty does not arise
(except, at times, with respect to those facts). That one such
as myself deems such views morally infirm, does not imply
that every instance of “abortion on demand” is a morally
acceptable “choice.” 102 I believe that the factors bearing on a
proper moral judgment are not only various and subtle, but
are often not fully accessible to anyone but the mother,
especially so to outsiders to her family. I am certain that
many abortions lack, and that many have, moral
acceptability, but I also believe, no less strongly, that even a
careful appraisal of the relevant factors will often not
enable an outsider to judge the matter very confidently.103
101. S TO UT, supra note 47, at 47.
102. I hope it is obvious that the truth of the sentence in the text would not
be vitiated by disagreement with my view as to the morality of abortion. For
moral assertions grounded in their faith traditions but roughly congruent with
my views, see EV ANGELI CAL LUT HE RAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, A S OCIAL S TATEMENT
ON A BORTION (1991), available at http://www.elca.org/SocialStatements/abortion/;
and Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), http://www.pcusa.org/101/101-abortion.htm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2007).
103. For a rigorous, sensitive, and probing illustration of the variousness
and complexity of the question, see James A. Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical
Perspective, in T HE M O RALITY OF A BO RTIO N: LEGAL AND HISTO RI CAL
PERSPECTIVES 101 (John T. Noonan ed., 1970). For a more general discussion,
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The barriers to epistemic confidence are formidable, and for
that reason alone legal barriers or other coercive responses
are, in my judgment, morally unjustified.
Abortion to one side, I believe that epistemic modesty in
judging the moral universe of others is often morally
appropriate, and that its absence is a morally hazardous
trait, but whether that judgment is right or wrong,
epistemic modesty is not inconsistent with a realist view of
morality.
(iv) The polar concern is equally misplaced. Moral
realism does not warrant, or justifiably lead to, excessive
certainty about moral judgments. Realists about moral
questions—I defer to the next paragraph reference to
judgments based on revelation—have in principle no lesser
capacity than relativists to recognize the tentativeness of
their moral beliefs. Katharine Bartlett has wisely described
an outlook that a sensible moral realist would find wholly
apt, one of “an ideal of self-critical commitment whereby I
act, but consider the truths upon which I act subject to
further refinement, amendment, and correction.” 104 She
goes on:
Som e “truths” . . . seem to confirm the view that truth does exist
(it must; these things are true) if only I could find it . . . . The
problem is the human inclination to make this list of “truths” too
long, to be too uncritical of its contents, and to defend it too
harshly and dogmatically. Positionality [the word she coined to
describe her approach] reconciles the existence of reliable,
experience-based grounds for assertions of truth . . . with the need
to question and im prove these grounds. 105

It is here that religiously-grounded morality presents a
conceptually more challenging context. To the certain
believer, certainty does not inhere only in questions of the
sort that Geertz calls “world-views,” how reality is put
together.106 Those views accredit with like certainty
developing a position consistent with (although different from) that taken in the
text, see Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20 PHIL. & PUB .
AFF. 223 (1991).
104. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV . L. R EV . 829,
883-84 (1990).
105. Id.
106. See supra text accompanyi ng note 34.
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epistemological premises about the truth of moral
principles, however “uncritically” embraced or many in
number.107 A believer asked to accept the “justification” for
contrary beliefs will experience the request as demanding
more than simple humility. 108
Yet the one seeking to engage a moral question from a
different faith tradition, or from none, cannot be expected to
find Bartlett‟s admonition against speaking “too harshly
and dogmatically” sufficiently put aside. I do not know a
way out of this impasse.
(v) Finally, moral realism is not inconsistent with a
commitment to pluralism in social policy. It unnecessarily
gives credence to the rhetoric of anti-relativism to assert a
relativist morality—“it is all relative,” or “it is just your
opinion”—in responding to a moral claim one rejects, when
the response in actuality would be that the claim either has
no moral valence or is in fact immoral.109 Anti-antirelativism can therefore properly espouse a (limited) form of
anti-relativism of its own, but without the rhetorical fervor
that often accompanies objections to relativism. Our society
is quick to treat the assertion that another is in error as on
(or over) the edge of a required tolerance for diverse
107. See, for example, the many moral precepts contained in the 613
mitzvot (i ncumbent obligations) of Orthodox J udaism or the 2865 paragraphs
of the Roman Catechism.
108. It would be a pla y on words for a Protestant Christian to respond, “ I
am „justified‟ by faith, not by respect for persons who lack it (although I have
that),” but t he response would ha ve appropriate salience nonetheless.
109. An example of the former is, in my judgment, an objection to
homosexual sex: whatever the undeniable moral significance of much sexual
activity, I see no basis for regarding the sex of one‟s partner as a morally salient
factor. An example of the latter (a morally grounded position that is itself
immoral) is the exclusion of homosexuals from access to various benefits
available to heterosexuals in analogous relationships. Of course, these examples
are highly contestable; suffice it to say that I believe that homosexual sex is not
per se immoral, whether the contrary belief is justified or not, and that seeking
to bring about a legal response based on moral condemnation of homosexuality
is an immoral act. For some “pointing” discussions (all religiously grounded),
see RICHARD B. HAYS, T HE M ORAL V ISION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 400 (1996);
John B. Cobb, Jr., Being Christian About Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALIT Y
AND C HRISTI AN F AITH 89 (Walter Wink ed., 1999); Jeffrey Stout, How Charity
Transcends the Culture Wars, 31 J. R ELIGIOUS ET HICS 169 (2003). However, this
is not the place to argue the correctness of my beliefs, for their truth or fa lsity
has nothing to do with relativism, whether dragged into the debate by one side
or the other.
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viewpoints. 110 To disagree is not intolerance (although one
can be intolerant in disagreement). To say that you are
wrong is not to attempt to silence you (although it might be
expressed in such a way, or lead to such an attempt). To
respond to a moral avowal by shifting the focus from a
challenge to its correctness to a relativist claim is the
converse of the failing of the anti-relativist. If a red herring
is thrown into your fishing pail, (a fortiori, if you find
yourself having thrown one in 111) don‟t proceed to examine
it; throw it overboard.
CONCLUSION
According to a rabbinical interpretation, the L ord said to Moses:
“Wherever you see the trace of man, there I stand before you . . . .”
When engaged in a conversation with a person of different
religious commitment I discover that we disagree in matters
sacred to us, “does the im age of God I face disappear? Does God
cease to stand before me?”

Abraham Joshua Heschel 112
In considering the destructive force of conclusory or
triumphalist dismissals of opposing positions with the label
“relativism,” I seek more than the elimination from the
conversation of a diversion. Greater acknowledgment of the
fact that important controversies in contemporary society
110. For two eloquent and troubled accounts of this phenomenon among
students, see generally Ka y Haugaard, Suspending Moral Judgment: Students
Who Refuse to Condemn the Unthinkable, C HRON . HIGHE R ED ., June 27, 1997, at
B4; Robert L. Simon, The Paralysis of „Absolutophobia‟, C HRON . HIGHE R ED.,
supra, at B5, (“Discussion of moral issues need not consist of two fanatics
asserting conflicting principles they regard as self-evident; it can invol ve
dialogue, the consideration of the points raised by others, and an admission of
fallibility on all sides.”). These essays are excerpted in GOO DMAN & LESNICK ,
supra note 46, at 107-11).
111. I owe to Ed Hartnett my belated realization that a relativist response
is plainly far more widespread in contemporary society than my passing
parenthetical admonition implies. How much greater, what accounts for its
appeal, and why I believe that my critique of anti-relativist talk nonetheless
retains its salience, are complex questions, which for better or worse I do not
address here.
112. ABRAHAM JOSHUA HES CHEL , No Religion is an Island, in NO RELIGION IS
AN ISLAND : A BRAHAM J OSHUA HESCHEL AND INTERRELIGIO US DI ALO GUE 8 (Harold
Kasimov & Roger Sherwin eds., 1991).
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are a product of a diversity of justifiably held discernments
of moral truth can prompt efforts to enhance:
- apprehension of the need to articulate the
epistemological bases of one‟s beliefs;
- self-awareness about expressions that cross the
frontier between justified belief and certainty;
- openness to the possibility that incompatible beliefs
(though strongly believed to be in error) may nonetheless be
justified; and
- resistance toward the temptation to caricature
opposing positions, and to demonize those who hold them.
To the extent that all that happens,113 disagreement
will surely persist, perhaps not even be lessened in extent.
It would be naive to presume otherwise. However, it is not
beyond hope to look toward a lessening of its intensity and
hostility, and a greater recognition of the compatibility
between a proper continuing assertion of what one believes
to be the Truth and a genuine (yet bounded) receptivity to
pluralism in the setting of social policy. 114

113. Cathleen Kaveny bases her response to the Encyclical , Evangelium
Vitae, in signifi cant part on the dual assertion that “many women who
consider access to abortion to be a fundamental aspect of thei r freedom are
epistemically justified although tra gically wrong in this belief.” Ka veny, supra
note 79, at 146.
114. David Hollenbach has written a ma rvelously rich, sophisticated,
thought-provoki ng—and heartening—study of the contours , possibilities, and
importance of what he terms “intellect ual solidarity” in “a community of
freedom.” D AVID H OLLE NBACH, T HE COMMO N G OO D AND C HRISTI AN ET HI CS
(2002).
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